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WHO IS TO BLAME?

How differences arose between
China's Maoist leaders
and the USSR and other
socialist countries



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Of late the Peking leadership, Western propaganda organs and revisionists of every hue have spared no effort in distorting the true history of Soviet-Chinese relations. They are out to rewrite glorious pages in the history of the two states and peoples and to make the Chinese people and world public doubt the sincere character of the internationalist policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet government towards the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China.

In fulfilment of decisions taken at its congresses the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is tirelessly striving to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations. The CPSU has not only publicly declared its intentions but has repeatedly taken specific steps for their practical realization. The 25th CPSU Congress, held in 1976, for instance, made it absolutely clear that, if China were to return to a truly Marxist-Leninist course, abandon its policy of hostility towards the socialist countries and take the road of cooperation and

solidarity with the socialist world, this would meet with a favourable response in the Soviet Union and would open up possibilities for developing relations with China along the lines of socialist internationalism. The 26th Congress held in 1981 reaffirmed the Soviet Communist Party's principled stand on all aspects of state relations between the USSR and China.

It was natural to expect that after Mao Zedong's death in September, 1976, a turning point might have taken place in Soviet-Chinese relations, or at least a change for the better. It was no secret that Mao and his followers had been working zealously to disrupt these relations, especially since the late 1950s and the early 1960s. That is precisely why the Soviet Union multiplied its efforts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations after Mao's death.

To this end from 1976 to 1980, i.e. in the period between the 25th and 26th Congresses, a number of steps were taken on the initiative of the CPSU Central Committee to make it clear to the new Chinese leadership that the Soviet Union bore goodwill towards China and was ready to normalize its relations with that country. For instance, on the USSR's initiative negotiations on frontier regulation have been continued since 1969 and in 1979 the first rounds of negotiations on the normalization of interstate relations were held, at which the Soviet side introduced a wide range of constructive proposals, which were, however, rejected by Peking. In 1971 the USSR proposed signing a treaty with China on renunciation of the use of force. Under the terms of this treaty both sides were to pledge not to use armed force against each other and not to

use any type of weapon—conventional, rocket or nuclear—against each other. Later, in 1973, the USSR proposed concluding a non-aggression treaty with China.

In March, 1978, on the eve of a session of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union once again took important initiatives which could have led to the normalization of relations. At the annual Soviet-Chinese trade negotiations the Soviet side regularly manifests its readiness to extend trade on a mutually advantageous basis, to hold talks on signing a long-term trade agreement and to revive frontier trade. Well known are the Soviet proposals on reviving contacts between friendship societies and in the sphere of public health, and on restoring cooperation between the Chinese and Soviet Academies of Sciences. All these proposals still stand, despite China's invariably negative reaction.

Now, as before, the stand taken by the Chinese leadership is the chief obstacle in the way of normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations. The Peking leaders are keeping to Mao's anti-Soviet course. In a situation when the Chinese leadership, whose composition is continually being renewed, is seeking to assert itself along the old lines of hegemonism, anti-Sovietism and refurbished Maoism, the Soviet Union's acts of goodwill are not meeting with a positive response from the Chinese side.

This is shown by the fact that China's post-Maoist leadership has not made a single proposal to improve Soviet-Chinese relations and refuses to extend trade or maintain cooperation in the field of science and culture. In its pathologic-

al anti-Sovietism the Chinese side has not even responded to the proposal to establish business-like contacts between Chinese and Soviet seismologists. Moreover, in documents issued by the highest Chinese government bodies and in statements by its leaders the Soviet Union is invariably depicted as China's chief ideological, political and military enemy.

Yet the history of Soviet-Chinese relations shows that there are not and cannot be any objective reasons for alienation, let alone confrontation, between the peoples of the two countries. On the contrary, all the necessary prerequisites exist for friendship and cooperation.

Today the Maoists and their adherents in other countries are sparing no effort to falsify the true reasons for, and the nature of, the difficulties and exacerbations in Soviet-Chinese relations. No little ink has been used in attempts to lay the blame for this on the CPSU and the Soviet Union. It is well known that such falsifications are eagerly taken up and inflated by anti-communist propaganda of every hue.

It is no accident that in Western historical studies there is a flood of falsifying books, pamphlets and articles seeking to justify Peking's foreign and domestic policies, and to distort the true facts of Soviet-Chinese relations and the history of the differences between the Maoist leadership and the world communist movement. It must be stressed that Maoists themselves willingly spread lies and falsifications of every kind on these questions. They take a hand in helping press organs and Sinologists in capitalist countries to build up myths on these issues. Indicative in this respect are the statements carried by

the Japanese newspapers *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Mainichi Shimbun* in January, 1972, on the substance of the talks held between certain "representatives of Shanghai" and Japanese trade union delegates on what are termed the USSR's "eleven crimes" against China. Modifications of these Maoist-hatched falsifications can still be found in foreign publications.

Peking's fabrications deal with the most diverse questions. Many of them have been duly exposed in Soviet press. Nevertheless, the list of lies and falsifications continues to grow and this makes it necessary to provide additional information on particular points.

There is another reason also for doing this. Persons who have a vague idea of the history of Soviet-Chinese relations and the Peking leaders' real aims, or who are duped by Chinese propaganda sometimes claim that the roots of anti-Sovietism lie in certain objective circumstances, such as "a conflict of Soviet and Chinese national interests" and not in the nationalistic essence of the Chinese leaders' policy and their general political line. Adherents of such views often allude to Mao Zedong's hypocritical statements about "friendship" with the Soviet Communist Party and the USSR, or his remarks to the effect that China and its Communist Party would always strive for "unity and solidarity" with the Soviet people and Soviet Communists, and so on. Sometimes the anti-Sovietism of Mao Zedong and his clique is explained by "personal grievances" on their part.

The facts, however, show that in Mao's lifetime Peking had devised a special "programme" of aggravating relations with the Soviet Union.

This alone can account for the fact that from the 1960s the Soviet Communist Party's repeated proposals to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations were either left unanswered or were deliberately buried under mountains of ridiculous charges based on falsifications and juggling with the facts.

The facts, however, leave no doubt as to the hypocritical nature of the charges made against the CPSU, which is accused of worsening Soviet-Chinese relations, of "curtailing Soviet aid to China" and of "recalling specialists" from China in the early 1960s, all in answer to the Chinese Communist leaders' "independent stand". For it is common knowledge that Mao's group launched its anti-Soviet campaign at the moment China's close ties with the Soviet Union became a brake on China's hegemonistic schemes. The smokescreen of allegations about Peking's "revolutionary" spirit and the Soviet Communist Party's "revisionism" was used to mask CPC's deviation from a principled stand.

To be objective one must note that Mao Zedong's systematic attacks on the Soviet Union date from the time when the relations between the two countries were quite friendly. In November, 1956, Mao Zedong claimed that in the Soviet Union "...Leninism is thrown away" and in March, 1959, that "military-economic exploitation of the landlord type" existed in the USSR.

Mao Zedong bitterly resented the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress and the criticism of the personality cult. Concealing his true views at the time Mao Zedong feigned approval of the Congress decisions. Actually he regarded the personality cult question as a direct threat to

his position as China's supreme ruler and to his claim to be a "living classic" in the international communist movement.

At the second session of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1958 and at the meeting of the CPC Central Committee in August, 1959, in Beidah Mao spoke of the need to "prepare for a split" and "to have no fear of a split". It was then that he set the task of "engineering contradictions" in China's relations with the Soviet Union and the CPSU. In 1964, when the CPSU and many fraternal parties were making efforts to normalize relations with the Communist Party of China Mao declared that the USSR was "a fascist Hitler-type state" and he persuaded the Chinese leadership that it was expedient to make a full break with the USSR.

Thus the question is not one of alleged "in-sults" inflicted on Mao Zedong but that, spurred on by his ambitions, he was out to foist his line, cult and hegemony on the socialist community and the world revolutionary movement.

In the mid-1950s, however, Mao Zedong still found it difficult to make a sharp turn in Soviet-Chinese relations. It was opposed by the Communist internationalists in the Chinese leadership and it was hindered by the broad ties in all spheres between the USSR and China and by the general international situation. Mao Zedong was forced to keep his anti-Soviet course under cover. This is what he said of China's contacts with the Soviet Union in 1958: "There are many false rumours about relations between our two countries. Have we got the strength to concern ourselves with such numerous rumours? What should be done about this false hearsay? The

deuce with them! We shall be brothers of a single family for ten thousand years."

Mao Zedong needed time to prepare Chinese public opinion and to fan nationalistic anti-Soviet sentiments among the Chinese people.

Since 1958 the Peking leaders stepped up their splitting activities in the international communist movement and began to set fraternal parties against the CPSU. For instance, they said to the Albanians that "they had put up with the CPSU's line and policy after the 20th Congress for four years and two months and were fed up with it". To discover the true state of affairs let us look at a few typical instances in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations.

OPPOSING A COORDINATED POLICY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES [1960s]

It should hardly be necessary to prove that coordination of the socialist states' foreign policies in the interests of the struggle for peace and people's freedom is a manifestation of proletarian internationalism in its most obvious form. This coordination promotes the security of the socialist countries and makes it possible more effectively to influence the entire course of world development in the interests of peace, democracy, national independence and socialism.

The basic features of the socialist states' coordinated foreign political course in the 1960s were clearly defined back in 1957 in the Declaration of the Meeting of Representatives of the

Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries and in the Peace Manifesto, as well as in the Statement and the Appeal to the Peoples of the World adopted by the fraternal parties in 1960. In pursuing its peace policy the world socialist system achieved tangible success and was able to paralyse imperialism's aggressive ambitions. Here a positive role was played by cooperation in foreign policy between the world's two biggest socialist countries—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. This cooperation had a sound international legal foundation—the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950.

But from the late 1950s and early 1960, when Peking had already defined its great power aims on the world scene, the Chinese government began to undertake separate actions running counter to the general line of the socialist world's peace struggle. As proclaimed in Peking in the early 1960s, "the Cold War and international tension have been extremely helpful in educating the people". The aggravation of international tension was claimed to be "an advantage", for "in the conditions of international tension Communist Parties could develop more rapidly and the rates of their development could be stepped up" and so international tension was "a good thing". Statements to this effect were made by Mao Zedong and he did not hesitate to act accordingly.

From the platform of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, which gathered for its session in June, 1960 the Chinese representatives (Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and

Deng Xiaoping among others) pounced upon the positions of Marxist-Leninist parties on questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and disarmament in a bid to foist upon the socialist countries their adventurist foreign policy line. They advocated the building of inter-state relations along the lines of a "tit for tat" policy, they rejected negotiations as a method of settling disputes, claiming that "it would be deceiving mankind to negotiate with imperialists", and they castigated the socialist countries' concerted efforts in the struggle for disarmament as "futile and even harmful". Resorting to Mao Zedong's "sudden attack" method, the Chinese leaders virtually divulged the essential aspects of the socialist countries' foreign policy tactics and strategy to a broad non-Communist audience without any preliminary discussion of these questions between the Central Committees of the parties concerned.

Despite all attempts by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist parties to settle the "incident" the CPC leadership persisted in foisting its own foreign political course on the whole international communist movement during bilateral and multilateral meetings (in Moscow and Bucharest).

At the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963 the leadership of the Communist Party of China launched a new ideological attack against the CPSU and the international communist movement. A frenzied attack was made on the socialist countries' foreign policy in order to frustrate the socialist countries' measures aimed at averting a nuclear war—a vital problem of international politics.

At the time of the Caribbean crisis in 1962 it became clear that the Peking leaders were ready to sacrifice all ideals and values, including world peace, for the sake of their political aims. When the grave threat of US invasion hung over Cuba and the world was hovering on the brink of a nuclear war the Chinese leaders openly attempted to provoke a large-scale international conflict.

At the beginning, when the international situation was particularly tense and there was an urgent need for a common front against the aggressive actions of US imperialism the CPC leaders, unlike the USSR and other countries, refrained from taking active measures in support of Cuba. The Maoist leadership preferred to play a waiting game so as to have the final say, regardless of the outcome.

When the tension was reduced and things took a turn for the better China suddenly launched a vociferous campaign "of vigorous support for the Cuban people's struggle for independence, sovereignty and dignity". At the same time Chinese propaganda unequivocally claimed that the USSR's position was detrimental to Cuba. Demonstrating their opposition to settling the Caribbean crisis through peaceful negotiations and goading the USSR and Cuba to actions fraught with military conflict, the Chinese leaders tried to prove the "righteousness" of their own views on the subject and thereby to discredit the policy of peaceful coexistence. Chinese representatives spread anti-Soviet fabrications about the Caribbean crisis in international democratic organizations and at various international forums.

The Maoists were out to provoke a military clash between the USSR and the USA and then to feather their nest during the ensuing holocaust. In this connection the capitalist press published several curious statements.

The New York Times of November 7, 1962, wrote, for instance, that Peking had long been ready to fight to the very last American and to the very last Russian.

During the dangerous situation in the Caribbean the Chinese leaders failed to make any businesslike, constructive proposals that would have secured Cuba's interests and averted a new war. Moreover, far from doing everything to help settle the crisis, Peking began its military actions on the Chinese-Indian frontier precisely in those days, thereby creating yet another seat of international tension. These actions were eloquent testimony to the Chinese leaders' true aims. They had taken advantage of a situation when the attention of the whole world was rivetted on the acute international crisis in the Caribbean in order to achieve their nationalistic targets.

Furthermore, seeking to cast aspersions on the socialist countries' Leninist foreign policy, in 1963 Peking viciously opposed the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which despite its limited character was the first real success in the long struggle waged by the peace-loving states and broad contingents of people all over the world against the danger of a nuclear war. This document was highly significant for the further seeking of ways to settle controversial issues between states with different

social systems, and it evoked a broad response and won support in all parts of the world. Closing its eyes to these reassuring results and utterly disregarding the fact that the Treaty was viewed by world public opinion as a major achievement of the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Chinese government subjected it to frenzied attacks. The reason for its hysterical stand became clear in October, 1964, when China tested its first A-bomb. To this very day it is continuing nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The radioactive fall-out that resulted from the test held in October, 1980, affected the population of Japan, the US, Canada and Mexico, leading to a storm of protest in these countries and throughout the world.

In those years the actions of the Chinese leaders on the international scene were clearly aimed at driving a wedge into the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, counterposing it to the socialist community and linking up with the imperialist powers up to directly siding with them on several issues. Thus it was a case not of a mere deviation from the socialist countries' coordinated foreign policy but of a substantial re-orientation of China's foreign policy. It was steadily becoming more and more obvious that China was abandoning class positions in its foreign policy, undermining the common front of the anti-imperialist struggle and trying to set it against the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

Peking's peculiar attitude to its ally, the Soviet Union, who was sparing no effort to help China build socialism, seemed more than strange at the time, all the more because the USSR's

truly internationalist position in defence of China's interests was commonly known. Suffice it to recall that in 1949-1950 (to say nothing of the pre-revolutionary period) the Soviet Union, acting on the request of the Chinese government, sent huge Soviet aircraft formations to China to protect the republic from enemy air raids, thereby ensuring the safety of Shanghai, one of the country's major industrial centres, and frustrating the attacks of US and Chang Kaishi troops. In September, 1958, during the mounting Taiwan crisis the Soviet government openly warned the US government that the Soviet Union would regard an attack on China as one on the USSR, with all the ensuing consequences. Moreover, the leaders of the Communist Party of China had in their time endlessly spoken about the exceptional importance of Soviet-Chinese friendship for China. "The signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between China and the USSR," wrote Mao Zedong, "not only means tremendous aid in the building of a new China, but is also a powerful guarantee against aggression, and of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world."¹

Words are words and facts are facts, however. In the early 1960s the Communist Party of China already began to violate the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of February 14, 1950. It persistently evaded fulfilment of Article 4 of the Treaty which called for the holding of consultations "on all major international questions affecting the common interests of the Soviet Union and Chi-

¹ *Renmin ribao*, February 14, 1951.

na". The Chinese government concealed its intentions of opening fire on the off-shore islands in the Formosa Strait in 1958, and failed to inform the Soviet government of China's contemplated military action against India, or of the substance of Sino-American talks which began in 1955, and it violated its obligations on many other points.

The Soviet government for its part adhered strictly to the provisions of the Treaty regarding mutual consultations and the exchange of foreign political information. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union regularly provided the CPC Central Committee and the Chinese government with extensive material on major points of the international situation and Soviet foreign policy. From 1960 to 1963 alone the Communist Party of China received over 140 such items of information both in written and oral form.

The foreign political relations of the CPSU and the Soviet government with China were invariably based on trust and a profound interest in coordinating both countries' efforts on the international scene.

CURTAILING ECONOMIC TIES

The CPC leadership carried over its ideological differences with the USSR and other socialist countries to inter-state relations and this had a particular impact on economic cooperation. This was not surprising because the Maoist leadership was out to switch its entire policy from socialist lines to the lines of imperialism. To put these plans into practice it had to show its

future partners that it had not only changed its ideological course but was "making room" for economic activities with imperialist states. Thus the Maoist leadership began to oust the USSR and other socialist countries from the system of its foreign economic ties. This aspect of Peking's policy became particularly obvious since 1960, that is to say, when the Communist Party of China began to advance "a special platform" in the world communist movement and inside the country.

The Chinese government demanded the revision of all former treaties and protocols on Soviet-Chinese economic and scientific and technological cooperation, it declined to accept a considerable part of the planned deliveries of Soviet plant and began to curtail Soviet-Chinese trade.

On October 31, 1960, Ye Jizhuang, China's Minister of Foreign Trade, and Luo Guibo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the Soviet government through the Soviet ambassador to Peking that China intended to revise its treaties with the USSR on economic and scientific and technological cooperation. When Gu Zhuoxin arrived in Moscow in June, 1961, at the head of the Chinese economic delegation to take part in the negotiations, he said that the Chinese government intended to decline the technological assistance of the USSR in building 89 industrial facilities and 35 shops, plants and other units. In August, 1961, Zhou Enlai in his talks with the USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade asked for a two-year postponement of deliveries of plant and materials from the USSR, pleading "difficulties that had cropped up in

China's national economy due to natural calamities", although the respective agreement had been signed only two months previously. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government had to agree to these terms although most of the plant worth many million dollars was already at the manufacturing stage or had been ordered from third countries.

At the request of the Communist Party of China deliveries of plant and materials from the USSR for projects that were under construction with Soviet technological assistance were postponed for a term of two years; this was recorded in the inter-state protocol of May 13, 1962.

In December, 1962, the Soviet government proposed to the Chinese government that talks be held to specify the volume and range of plant deliveries for the years to come. The Soviet proposal remained unanswered.

Facts showed that the Chinese leadership was deliberately curtailing its economic ties with the USSR contrary to the interests of the Chinese people and to the detriment of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

The Soviet Union had repeatedly made efforts to improve the situation by making specific proposals for promoting economic cooperation and trade. Unfortunately none of the Soviet proposals received support from the Chinese side. Peking continued to curtail its economic ties with the USSR, thereby reducing the total volume of Soviet-Chinese trade (including technical assistance) in 1962 to 36.5 per cent of the 1959 level. The sharp decline in economic cooperation and trade continued throughout 1963 and 1964. In 1963 the trade turnover fell

by 23 per cent as against 1962 and in 1964 by yet another 20 per cent.

At first China explained the curtailing of economic ties with the USSR and other socialist countries by pleading the "difficult economic situation in China". This was the reason given by Gu Zhuoxin, who headed the Chinese government delegation at the Soviet-Chinese talks on February 10, 1961, and by Zhou Enlai in August, 1961. Then, contradicting all that had been said, Peking began to put the sole blame for the curtailing of economic cooperation on... the Soviet Union.

The projects that had been under construction with Soviet aid in China were deliberately frozen. They were preserved as a peculiar kind of "museum" used for discrediting Soviet economic aid. Trade marks were removed from Soviet machine tools and plant, the equipment was deliberately damaged and dismantled and in this condition demonstrated to Chinese citizens and foreigners as "evidence" of Soviet Union's negligence in fulfilling its commitments.

Many more facts of malicious behaviour by Chinese organizations could be cited. Although Peking's line was already quite obvious Maoist propaganda and officials continued to spread fabrications to the effect that the Soviet Union had stopped deliveries to Chinese enterprises.

The policy of thwarting Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation, as has now become clear, was geared to Peking's political aim of compromising the USSR in the eyes of the Chinese people and it served as an excuse for stepping up its anti-Soviet campaign.

In an official letter to the CPSU Central Committee of February 29, 1964, the CPC Central Committee went so far as to claim that there was no such thing as Soviet aid to China and reduced the extensive programme of Soviet aid to ordinary "trade operations". Such statements were convenient for justifying the Maoist course, but history cannot be rewritten at will. In this connection one may recall a few episodes from the history of Soviet-Chinese relations testifying to the Soviet Union's friendly and disinterested aid to China.

According to the Agreement between China and the USSR on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen of February 14, 1950, the Soviet Union handed over to China the rights to joint administration of the railway with all the pertaining equipment.

In October, 1954, the Soviet government handed over gratis to the Chinese government the installations at the naval base of Port Arthur which had been restored and built by the Soviet side.

With the help of the Soviet Union China restored or rebuilt over 200 large modern enterprises, including iron-and-steel works in Anshan, Wuhan, Baotou, Benxi, the metallurgical works in Qiqihar specializing in the production of special grades of steel, and large centres of the chemical industry in Jilin, Taiyuan, Lanzhou and elsewhere. In 1959, China's industrial facilities which were built or reconstructed with Soviet assistance accounted for 35-40 per cent of China's total output of iron, steel and rolled stock, 85 per cent of its total output of trucks and trac-

tors, 40 per cent of its electricity output and 35 per cent of its heavy engineering output.

At the time Peking said a great deal about fruitful cooperation between China and the USSR and about Soviet aid in training Chinese specialists.

China did in fact receive extensive scientific and technological assistance. Nearly 50 per cent of all Soviet technological documentation given to the socialist countries went to China. By July 1, 1957, a total of 159 projects had been designed in China using Soviet documentation, and over 300 new types of industrial goods had been put into production. In ten years or so the USSR provided China with 24,000 sets of scientific and technological documentation, virtually gratis. According to foreign experts the purchase of such documentation in the world market would have cost China several thousand million dollars.

In the period from 1949 to 1959 over 900 Soviet teachers (500 of whom were specialists in technological subjects) were sent to China. Soviet specialists trained nearly 17,000 young Chinese teachers for independent teaching and research work. In China's universities Soviet teachers helped set up 900 new laboratories. Moreover, a great number of Chinese specialists were able to improve their qualifications by working with Soviet specialists.

These are only a few of the facts which could have been cited here. At the time China had assessed them at their true worth. In 1957 Mao Zedong said: "Let us see who designed and equipped so many important plants for us. Was it the United States or Britain? No. Only the So-

viet Union agrees to do this, because it is a socialist country and our ally."¹ In February, 1959, *Renmin ribao* wrote: "Soviet aid to economic construction in our country, both in its quantity and scope, is unprecedented in history."

China often raises the question of Soviet credits to China. It claims that Soviet long-term credits were of no importance to China. Is that so?

The Soviet Union provided China with long-term credits to the tune of 1,816 million roubles. On February 14, 1950, it granted China credits at interest rates of one per cent to the amount of 300 million US dollars, which were designated as payment for machinery, plant and materials, and was used accordingly. In 1954 the Soviet Union handed over to China its assets in Soviet-Chinese joint companies and granted it long-term interest-free credit of 62,600,000 roubles to cover the value of these assets. In 1960 Soviet organizations delivered 288 million roubles' worth of plant, materials and other commodities to China charged to the account of the interest-free credit. Most of the Soviet credits were designated for China's national economy, chiefly for the development of its heavy industry.

The Soviet Union gave China immense aid in strengthening its defence potential. This aid was not confined to the "mere sale of arms", as the Maoists claim nowadays. During the Korean war the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and the fact that Soviet armed forces in the Far East (Port Arthur

¹ *Renmin ribao*, June 19, 1957.

and Dairen) were in fighting trim kept the US from expanding its aggression and unleashing direct military intervention against China.

The USSR's aid to China in strengthening its defences is an example of genuine internationalism and loyalty to its duty as China's ally. The Soviet Union had repeatedly met the Chinese government's requests and in the 1950s pledged to render aid in building numerous war industry enterprises. In the period from 1950 to 1963 it helped China to build and bring into operation almost a hundred large munitions factories. The Soviet government provided China with weapons and material from its own reserves which were sufficient to re-equip scores of People's Liberation Army's infantry divisions. China also received all the facilities in Port Arthur. In the 1950s the Soviet Union also sent many specialists to China who helped organize arms production and acquaint Chinese army units with their use.

In the 1960s the Chinese government began to pay off its debt to the Soviet Union. This was done on its own initiative, at high speed and ahead of time, despite the country's economic hardships and contrary to all common sense. This fact was repeatedly brought to the attention of Chinese representatives. At first the motives behind such economically unreasonable actions were far from clear. Later, however, it became obvious that this was a deliberate measure. Maoist propaganda began to claim that the Soviet Union "had demanded repayment of credits before the appointed time" in total disregard of China's economic difficulties, thereby increasing the burden borne by the Chinese people, and that the Soviet Union "was out to use

its credits to China as a sanction against the CPC's ideological opposition to the CPSU".

Thus step by step the CPC leadership formulated "convenient reasons" to explain the mounting difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations.

In the early 1960s China misrepresented the nature of trade between the two countries, claiming that the Soviet Union was using it for "bringing political pressure to bear upon China", although only shortly before this China's leaders had regarded Soviet-Chinese trade as a form of "disinterested aid to China on the part of the USSR in the spirit of internationalism".

Thus the letter of the CPC Central Committee of February 29, 1964, published in China and several articles in the Chinese press specified the amount of food products and ores delivered by China to the USSR in exchange for plant and materials.

Inasmuch as the Chinese side continues to make political capital out of these facts it is worth recalling a few details. If one looks at the structure of China's exports to the USSR in those years one cannot fail to see that along with important commodities the Soviet Union received a considerable amount of produce that would probably have failed to find a market in the capitalist world. Among China's exports to the Soviet Union a notable place was taken by various consumer goods: domestic articles, clothes, handicraft wares, sports goods and so on. These commodities accounted for 39 per cent of the total volume of Chinese exports to the Soviet Union in 1959, over 46 per cent in 1960, almost 63 per cent in 1961, over 67 per cent in 1962 and 70 per cent in 1963. They were not essential

to the USSR and could have been easily manufactured by Soviet industry. The Soviet Union purchased these goods from China because it was sincerely eager to improve China's economic situation.

As for Soviet exports to China, from the early 1950s up to 1963 they amounted to 7,655 million roubles, of which plant and machinery accounted for 2,790 million roubles and raw and industrial materials, for 2,674 million roubles.

In short the Soviet Union was doing its best to turn China into an industrial state and at China's request was providing it with sophisticated plant and up-to-date machinery.

Contrary to these facts Peking continues to accuse the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of "coming out against the industrialization of fraternal countries" and seeking to preserve these countries' agrarian character.

Chinese propaganda allegations that China's food deliveries to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s were responsible for the Chinese people's material hardships after the failure of the "Big Leap" policy will not bear examination. Food-stuffs in fact accounted for less than 20 per cent of the total volume of China's contractual deliveries to the USSR in 1960. Moreover, the amount of food products sold by China to the Soviet Union that year was an insignificant proportion of China's total food production: rice—0.6 per cent, soya beans— 3.7 per cent, vegetable oil—2.7 per cent, meat and meat products—under 3 per cent. One can hardly believe that this amount would have saved the Chinese people from the starvation and hardships brought upon them by the Chinese leaders' adventurist policy.

It is indicative that in the late 1970s and early 1980s the Chinese leaders began to admit that the Maoist experiments of those days had brought the country to the verge of starvation. So the aforesaid allegations were no more than an attempt to put the blame on somebody else.

It is apparently no accident that China hushes up the fact that in the late 1960s, when the policy of "the three red banners—the general line, the Big Leap and the people's communes"—had driven the country to famine, the Soviet Union showed its concern for the Chinese people by declining food deliveries and subsequently ceased to buy food products from China. Only in 1964 did the Soviet Union, yielding to the pressure of an ultimatum from the Chinese government, agree to include a certain amount of food-stuffs (about eight per cent of the total value of Chinese deliveries to the USSR) in its imports from China.

The letter of the CPC Central Committee of February 29, 1964, which utterly misrepresented the reasons for the difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations, alleged that the prices for Soviet deliveries to China were "much higher" than the prices in the world market. It is worth recalling in this connection that at the beginning of its yearly trade negotiations with the Chinese representatives the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade always asked the opinion of the Chinese side about Soviet prices. The Chinese side had invariably replied that there were no grounds for revising the prices. Such was the case at the talks held in May, 1964, two months after the above-mentioned letter. The Chinese side had good reason to leave the prices un-

changed for they were generally favourable to China, this being another of the USSR's forms of aid to the Chinese people.

Switching to wilful aggravation of Soviet-Chinese relations in the early 1960s the Chinese government refused to fulfil its contractual obligations as regards the building of joint economic projects which were essential both to the Soviet Union and China. Among these was the Lanzhou (China)—Aktagai (USSR) railway line. The Soviet Union fulfilled its commitments in 1958; the Chinese side discontinued all work on the project after 1960 without even taking the trouble to explain the reasons for its behaviour. Although considerable sums had been spent on the Soviet section of the railway the line was never completed in China.

In April, 1962, the Soviet side proposed drawing up a joint programme of measures for the comprehensive development of the natural resources in the Amur basin. The Chinese side refrained from taking part in the project. The reasons for this were discovered much later, when it became clear that the area was intended for provocations against the Soviet Union.

While casting aspersions on the Soviet Union's trade and economic policy the Chinese leaders took pains to hush up the numerous Soviet proposals that were aimed at developing trade and economic relations between the two countries. Among the proposals advanced in 1963 and 1964 were proposals for the granting of long-term (15-20 year) credits on easy terms for increasing China's export resources, the exchange of foreign trade information and the coordi-

nation of foreign trade operations in the capitalist market—all of which would have been advantageous to both countries. The Soviet Union repeatedly proposed concluding a long-term treaty and long-term contracts for individual traditional goods. Regrettably, all these proposals were ignored.

THE ISSUE OF SOVIET SPECIALISTS AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

In its striving to compromise the international policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government and to shift to the Soviet Union the responsibility for China's economic failures at the time of the "Leap" policy and the worsening of Soviet-Chinese interstate relations China continues to distort the question of Soviet specialists. At the present time, when the Maoists' experiments of the late 1950s are being denounced even in China as a mistake, Peking is finding it ever more difficult to "sell" this fraudulent idea.

The CPSU and the Soviet government have time and again dwelt on the question of specialists and explained the true position. Before 1960 over 10,000 Soviet specialists were sent to China at the request of the Chinese government. There they passed on their professional experience to the Chinese people. Their work evidently brought results, because it was highly assessed by the Chinese leaders who spoke widely to the Chinese population about the need to learn from Soviet experience. In his speech at the 8th Con-

gress of the Communist Party of China in 1956 Zhou Enlai said: "Specialists from the Soviet Union and the people's democracies who are working in our country have made an outstanding contribution to our socialist construction." Li Fuchun, Deputy Premier of China's State Council, said on May 29, 1959: "Our assessment which is a sound one, is as follows: enterprises designed and built in our country with Soviet aid indeed embody all the best and most up-to-date which the Soviet Union has at its disposal. These enterprises are the backbone of our industry, not only in size but also in the level of their up-to-date technology... We knew before, and this is confirmed by the facts, that all Soviet specialists and design organizations did their utmost to ensure that these enterprises embodied the most advanced Soviet experience and were the best in the world. And they have succeeded in this. Such is our assessment of the aid rendered to us by Soviet organizations and specialists." Similar statements were made by other Chinese Communist leaders.

In the USSR consideration was always given to developing relations between Soviet specialists and local cadres. Bearing in mind the rapid growth of the national technological intelligentsia in China the Soviet side took care not to hamper the initiative of the Chinese cadres and not to hinder their rapid development. It was for this reason that the Soviet Union officially asked the Chinese leadership in 1956, 1957 and 1958 whether it was not yet time to recall the Soviet specialists. China invariably replied with a request that they should remain in the country.

In 1958 and 1959 many reports began to be received of the Soviet specialists being poorly treated by the Chinese authorities. This was the time when the Maoist "three red banners" course was being implemented in China. Inasmuch as Soviet people could not support these adventurist proposals that ran counter to Leninist principles of socialist economic policy and technological norms, Soviet specialists began to be treated contemptuously as manifesting "technological backwardness" and "conservatism" and their recommendations were no longer needed. In many cases technological and industrial adventurism led to grave accidents resulting in casualties.

Soviet specialists who were honestly performing their internationalist duty were treated with open distrust and shadowed, their private belongings were secretly searched, and so on. They began to protest at such treatment by the Chinese authorities, regarding it as an insult. In an interview with Wang Daohan, Deputy Minister of the First Ministry of Mechanical Engineering, Soviet specialist Zosimenko, who was protesting at rummaging in his belongings, had every reason to say: "When I had been to Germany in 1937 my suitcase was often checked and this was understandable. I cannot understand why this is being done here."

Seeking to provoke the recalling of Soviet specialists from China and thus create another pretext for further aggravation of Soviet-Chinese relations the Chinese leadership began to foist upon Soviet specialists its own anti-Leninist adventurist views on international questions and to incite them against the CPSU and the Soviet

government. These actions aroused the just indignation of Soviet people who began to apply to the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government for permission either to rebuff the provocative actions of the Chinese or to go back to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side was faced with the choice either of allowing Soviet specialists to enter into discussions which would inevitably sharpen the differences, or of recalling them, thereby preventing any conflicts on this point. Before taking a final decision the Soviet government approached the Maoist leadership with a request that normal working conditions be created for Soviet specialists in China and citing the relevant facts. It warned that otherwise it would have to recall them to the USSR. Since the Chinese side took no heed of repeated requests and appeals an official Note was dispatched to the Chinese government on July 16, 1960, informing it that in the situation obtaining the Soviet government had no alternative but to recall its specialists from China.

It is highly indicative that upon receiving the Note the Chinese government did not even deem it necessary to reply. Only after the first groups of Soviet specialists had already left China did the Chinese Foreign Ministry make a formal statement in favour of their remaining in the country, insisting all the while on its "right" to subject them to propaganda aimed against the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government.

This line of behaviour was additional evidence that Peking was not interested in having Soviet specialists in China. After 1958 the Maoists did

their best to make their further presence in China impossible. It is significant that China never gave any answer to Soviet offers to send the specialists back to China provided they were given suitable conditions for their work. Such offers were repeatedly made to China and were put in the letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the CPC Central Committee on November 29, 1963.

Nevertheless, the Chinese propaganda machine raised a hullabaloo about this, claiming that the "arbitrary recalling" of Soviet specialists had created enormous difficulties for China.

The above-mentioned letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of February 29, 1964, and other Chinese publications alleged that the departure of Soviet specialists had affected the fulfilment of China's economic plans. The groundless nature of such statements is self-evident because China's national economic plans, if one can call them such, bearing in mind the "Big Leap" policy of the 1950s and 1960s, were frustrated precisely in those economic sectors—agriculture, coal mining and transport—where either no Soviet specialists at all or a quite insignificant number were employed.

Of the 1,390 specialists working in China in the summer of 1960 nearly 1,100, or 80 per cent of the total number, were employed in the system of the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and in the iron-and-steel industry. Judging by Chinese documents the situation at China's iron-and-steel and machine-building enterprises was relatively normal. Failures were suffered in "small-scale" metallurgy and "traditional"

(craft) industry, with which Soviet specialists had nothing whatsoever to do.

How many Soviet specialists had actually been employed in the industries that suffered the greatest setbacks? There were four Soviet specialists in the coal mining, four in the Ministry of Communications, four in the Ministry of Light Industries, three in the Ministry of State Economies and one in the Ministry of Agriculture. Many specialists (140) were in no way connected with the country's economy. They were employed in the cultural, medical and other non-productive spheres. So there are absolutely no grounds for claiming that the departure of Soviet specialists adversely affected China's economy.

Contrary to all logic the Chinese leadership even claimed that China had no need for Soviet specialists. If this was the case, then why was such a hullabaloo raised about this question and why was the worsening of Soviet-Chinese relations attributed to the economic setbacks allegedly suffered by China due to the departure of Soviet specialists? It is obvious that the Maoists fabricated the story about the Soviet specialists with the aim of whipping up anti-Sovietism among the Chinese people and creating a pretext for switching China's global policy from the lines of scientific socialism to those of adventurism and great power ambitions.

In the letter of the CPC Central Committee of February 29, 1964, and in subsequent documents the Chinese Communist leaders claimed that the Soviet government had "cancelled 257 projects of scientific and technological cooperation" with China. The records present an entirely different picture. They show that it was the

Chinese side which made the proposal on October 31, 1960, to revise all existing agreements and protocols on Soviet-Chinese scientific and technological cooperation. On February 12, 1961, the Chinese representatives, participating in the talks on scientific and technological cooperation handed the Soviet delegation the draft of a letter containing the proposal to regard as invalid the Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement signed by the USSR and China on October 12, 1954, the Soviet-Chinese agreement on January 18, 1958, on joint scientific and technical research and Soviet assistance to China in this field, as well as other agreements and protocols on scientific and technological cooperation signed by ministries and departments of the contracting parties on the basis of the aforesaid agreements. By these actions the Chinese government annulled the Soviet Union's commitments to deliver technological documentation (1,129 projects) to China and to play host to Chinese specialists with the object of acquainting the latter with Soviet scientific and technological achievements (26 projects), as well as China's obligations to deliver technological documentation (159 projects) to the Soviet Union and receive Soviet specialists (68 projects).

All this shows that the Chinese government bore sole responsibility for curtailing economic, scientific and technological cooperation and that it did this for the same reason: it was discarding its policy of friendship with the USSR for one of enmity and confrontation.

In those same years China curtailed its economic cooperation not only with the USSR but

with other socialist countries as well. By 1962 its trade turnover with the member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) had fallen to almost one-third of the 1959 level and in 1963, it fell even further—by 20 per cent.

FRONTIER BLACKMAIL

The policy adopted by the Maoist leadership of creating tension in Soviet-Chinese relations was especially manifest in the matter of the Soviet-Chinese frontier.

For the first ten years after the formation of the People's Republic of China all was quiet on the Soviet-Chinese border which extends over 7,500 kilometres. Both sides gave each other help in combatting natural calamities in the frontier zone and the Soviet authorities always met the requests of the Chinese side as regards cattle grazing, the felling of timber and fishing in some of the Soviet frontier zones. Extensive research was carried on with the aim of studying and jointly utilizing the resources of the frontier rivers.

From the 1960s it was no longer a secret that the Chinese government was out to bring the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border to a head by creating a "territorial issue". It is indicative that the claims to Soviet territory which were put forward in 1957 in the pages of several official Chinese newspapers were not given the rebuttal they deserved either then or later. This did not escape notice. In the 1960s official Chinese representatives began to speak openly of these

claims, which had been initially advanced by bourgeois elements in China during their anti-socialist demonstrations in 1957.¹

Facts show that from the early 1960s Chinese citizens and frontier guards were instructed to gain a hold of the USSR's frontier areas and its islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers. On direct orders from the Peking authorities they began to provoke border incidents, making armed threats against Soviet citizens, sham attacks on frontier posts and attempts to kidnap Soviet frontier guards. The aim of all these provocations was to create border tensions thereby making it easier to fan chauvinistic sentiments among the Chinese population and whip up hatred for the Soviet people. Subsequent events such as China's armed provocation on Damansky Island and in the Zhalanshkol district in Central Asia in 1969 fully exposed the Maoists' schemes. The Maoists were using border provocations against the USSR and other neighbouring countries as a means of increasing political confrontation.

Their immediate aim was to establish anti-Sovietism as a long-term Party and state doctrine and this was achieved at the 9th, 10th and 11th Congresses of the Communist Party of China and during the adoption of the Constitutions of the People's Republic of China (1975 and 1978). The more distant aims were to sow factual if not legal doubt upon the existing Soviet-Chinese border in order to bolster Mao Zedong's fraudulent

¹ It is common knowledge that during the campaign of "struggle against 'Right'-wing elements" in China open claims were made to Soviet territory. They were carried even by official press organs.

lent "thesis" alleging the "...seizure of 1,500,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory by Russia" (Mao's interview with Japanese specialists in 1964).

The number of Chinese provocations continued to grow: from 400 in 1960 to over 5,000 in 1962. In 1963 the Chinese undertook over 4,000 provocational sallies into Soviet territory in the environs of the Argun, Amur and Ussuri rivers alone. Those involved acted on written instructions from Peking and their total number exceeded 100,000. It is worth remembering that in the early 1960s, the Chinese leaders had not doubted the correctness of the Soviet-Chinese border. This is how Zhou Enlai answered the question of whether there were any sections of the Soviet-Chinese border that were not clearly defined, put to him at a press conference held in Katmandu on April 28, 1960: "There is an insignificant discrepancy which can be settled easily by peaceful means."

Guided by the principles of internationalism and goodneighbourliness the Soviet government showed exceptional tolerance in the face of the Chinese authorities' countless border provocations. From the very first incidents, which dated from the early 1960s, the Soviet Union showed its willingness to hold friendly consultations with the Chinese side in order to delineate their state borders and normalize the situation. This proposal was contained in the Note of the USSR Foreign Ministry of November 29, 1960, to which the Chinese government gave no reply. Only on April 19, 1963, did the Chinese Foreign Ministry agree to the numerous Soviet proposals to hold consultations. They were held in 1964 in Peking

and virtually failed to produce any results. The fault for this lay with the Chinese side.

Peking often refers to the fact that the government of tsarist Russia had imposed unequal treaties on China. Yet it is common knowledge that the Soviet government annulled all the unequal treaties that had been imposed on other countries by tsarism either separately or jointly with other imperialist powers. Soviet Russia gave up tsarist Russia's spheres of influence in China, annulled the right of extritoriality and consular jurisdiction, handed over the portion of indemnities due to Russia for the needs of public education in China, abolished concessions and returned to China the right of way along the Chinese Eastern Railway. It put an end to all elements of inequality in Soviet-Chinese relations. This fact was noted not only by Sun Yatxieng but by Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders as well. It should be stressed that in none of Lenin's works nor in any other documents of the CPSU and the Soviet government was there ever any talk of revising border treaties or agreements.

The policy of rejecting the historically established border between the two countries, the fabrication of a "territorial issue" is fraught with great danger. In his day Lenin said: "Let the bourgeoisie start their filthy petty squabbles and their trading over frontiers, the workers of all countries and nationalities will not fall out over that sort of thing."¹

It is appropriate to recall here what Zhou Enlai told American journalist Edgar Snow in Oc-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 26, p. 344.

tober, 1960. He said that if everyone were to settle scores going back to such far-off historical times, the world would be plunged into chaos; the United States would have to go back under British rule, considering that the country had gained its independence less than two centuries ago.

China constantly stresses the fact that it has successfully settled its border questions and signed border treaties with nearly all its neighbours: Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Mongolia. Yet it cannot be denied that the Maoists have not ceased instigating border provocations against many neighbouring countries and continue to bring territorial claims against them. In analysing the Maoists' stand on territorial issues one cannot help observing that it stems from the chauvinistic claims of Chinese nationalists with their ambitions of reviewing China's "Golden Age", when as an empire it had subjugated many neighbouring states. Incidentally, if one were to follow Peking's dangerous logic which is rooted in these ambitions, there would be no alternative but to redraw the map of Asia. The question arises as to what historical period should be used as a "guide to action". The time when all China occupied a relatively small territory or when feudal China was in its heyday and extended its influence to neighbouring areas and peoples? One thing is clear and that is that by their territorial claims the Maoists are pursuing far-reaching predatory aims where the whipping up of anti-Sovietism is interlocked with Great Han hegemonistic ambitions.

The trend to create tensions on the Soviet-Chinese border and devise pretexts for confron-

tation with the USSR became obvious during the mass exodus from the Xinjiang Autonomous District. In the spring of 1962, over 60,000 inhabitants of Xinjiang, chiefly Kazakhs and Uighurs, crossed over into Soviet territory. They explained their action by their inability to tolerate any longer the national discrimination and oppression they were being subject to in their country.

When the stream of half-starved, poorly clothed refugees, among whom there were many women, children and old people, suddenly rushed over the border the Soviet side was confronted with a highly complicated problem. Everything was done to render emergency aid to these people. The Soviet government immediately asked the Chinese government to take urgent measures against the mass border violations. It asked for Chinese representatives to be sent to these areas with the object of carrying on explanatory work jointly with Soviet representatives among the refugees to achieve their speediest return to their homeland.

The question should have seemed clear enough. There had been mass violations of the Soviet frontier. In accordance with the norms of good-neighbourliness the Soviet government proposed settling the incident along friendly lines. How did the Chinese government react? It bluntly rejected the proposed method of consultations and a humane settlement of the question. Without taking any measures to stop the mass exodus of the Xinjiang population into Soviet territory, which continued for over a month, the Chinese government demanded the "return of the refugees by forcible means".

This, naturally, gave rise to the question: Why did the Chinese authorities, who had surely known that tens of thousands of Xinjiang residents were ready to flee their country, not only fail to prevent them from doing this but, as confirmed by witnesses, even provoke and urge them to take such drastic action? According to evidence supplied by the refugees the Chinese frontier authorities, who were witness to the whole operation, not only did nothing to stop them but gave them every assistance. In Kuldja and Chuguchak (Xinjiang) the Chinese authorities told citizens applying for permission to leave for the USSR that they "needed no visas", meaning they could simply cross the border. Chinese organs freely sold motor transport tickets to border points and helped the refugees to carry their heavy luggage in mail vans. Daily 10-12 lorries carrying 40-50 people each left Kuldja for the frontier areas. The refugees dumped luggage a few kilometres from the border where under the "paternal" eye of the Chinese authorities they began their march across the border.

It is quite obvious that the Chinese side had deliberately connived at the mass border violations and organized each new "occurrence" as a "convenient" pretext for worsening Soviet-Chinese relations, thereby implementing Mao Zedong's notorious plan to tear down the great edifice of Soviet-Chinese friendship which was being erected by the Chinese people and Communists, and to lay on its ruins the foundations of a Great Power pro-imperialist policy, the plan that Mao had nurtured back in the 1950s.

The various pretexts used by the Maoists for aggravating Soviet-Chinese relations were geared

in each case to the immediate, practical task. Thus the Chinese authorities used the incident of the refugees to clear the greater part of Xinjiang, which it was intended to turn into a testing ground for atomic weapons, from undesirable witnesses in the person of its non-Han inhabitants, an act that was provocative by nature and sinister in the manner of its execution.

It is indicative that the Chinese government began by calling the mass exodus of the Xinjiang population officially "a chance occurrence" but then proceeded to accuse the Soviet Union of "subversive activities in China's frontier areas", of "provoking tens of thousands of Chinese citizens to flee to the USSR" and so on.

The CPC leadership failed to deceive either its own people or those of other countries and shift the responsibility for the flagrant errors in its domestic policy on to someone else, errors that drove thousands of people, chiefly from among the national minorities, out of China. From 1960 to 1962 thousands of Chinese citizens were fleeing the country, going not only to the Soviet Union but to other neighbouring countries as well. Is the Soviet Union to be blamed for this too? What about the thousands of Chinese who have fled and are continuing to flee to Hong Kong and Macao? Have they been lured there by Soviet representatives?

Soviet state bodies have conducted unceasing explanatory work among the refugees from Xinjiang, doing their best to convince them to go back to China. And with good results: in the summer of 1963 over 500 persons agreed to return to China. Their decision could have set a

good example for the other refugees. But the Chinese authorities refused to take them back. Moreover, for two years the Chinese government stubbornly declined all Soviet proposals to hold the necessary consultations and it refused to take part in any meetings with the refugees. In reply to the USSR's proposal of June 19, 1964, the Chinese Foreign Ministry flatly refused to take back the refugees who had agreed to return to China, demanding the "unconditional" return of the entire contingent of Chinese citizens numbering about 60,000, who had crossed the border in the spring of 1962. The Chinese government insisted that the Soviet government "apply force" to tens of thousands of people and "return them to China" by force of arms, being well aware that the Soviet people would never agree to such a criminal action. At the same time the Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected a Soviet proposal that it send representatives to carry on explanatory work among the refugees, saying that the Chinese government would "never agree to this". Obviously here too the Maoists were out to create an impasse with a definite political purpose.

GROSS INTERFERENCE IN USSR AFFAIRS

In the early 1960s when Soviet-Chinese relations were growing ever more complicated Peking went over to campaigns of open interference in the internal affairs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state, although such interference contradicted not only

the principles of relations between socialist countries, expressed in the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950, but also elementary norms of inter-state relations.

The Chinese leadership, believing it had a special right to carry on anti-Soviet propaganda not only in China but in the Soviet Union too, decided to come out as the Soviet people's "educator". Hostile anti-Soviet propaganda was carried on in the USSR from the 1960s by the staffs of official Chinese institutions accredited in the USSR, by Chinese students, tourists, conductors of Peking-Moscow trains and members of Chinese delegations. They attempted to foist slanderous publications on Soviet people and to spread provocative rumours and slander. Radio programmes for the USSR were used for delivering sermons on how to "build socialism", "defend the revolution", "fight against the existing Soviet system", and so on.

Anti-Soviet elements in the West rubbed their hands with joy as Peking and its representatives abroad day after day spread the most atrocious lies about the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, about the "degeneration of Soviet society" and the "resurgence of capitalism in the USSR".

In its Note of March 7, 1964, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected Soviet protests against the gross violation of USSR sovereignty and declared that the Chinese authorities reserved the right to continue their activities.

For over 20 years now with a fervour that could have served a better purpose Peking has

been attempting to incite Soviet people against their Communist Party and state leadership. Its radio broadcasts which are conducted for 56 hours daily in many languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union, bristle with provocative appeals of all kinds. When such aspersions come from the Soviet Union's class enemies the Soviet people label them as vile propaganda. What can one say of such things when they come from those who vow fidelity to socialism? One can only wonder that Peking is taking such a long time to realize the futility of its attempts to drive a wedge between the CPSU and the Soviet people, and between the CPSU Central Committee and Party members. The Soviet people have repeatedly made indignant protests against the Maoists' subversive activities.

As a matter of fact it was already clear in the early 1960s that the nature of Peking's anti-Soviet activities could not be attributed merely to ideological differences between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, as was alleged by the Chinese side. Moreover, it has become quite obvious that the so-called ideological divergencies of opinion on "ways of carrying out revolution" have been and continue to be of importance to Peking. They were needed merely as a pretext for its broad anti-Soviet actions, which were essentially a political war against the USSR and its friends. Peking has long forgotten the discussion on the fundamental problems of our time which was used by the Maoists in the early 1960s as a pretext for fanning conflict.

Indeed, can the armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border and direct acts of subversion against the Soviet Union in the internation-

al arena be justified by ideological differences? The Maoists' actual "platform" is tantamount to political struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries by every means and method and no amount of abstract argument can disguise this fact. There is much talk now in Peking of the need to set up the "broadest front" with the participation of imperialist states for a "universal crusade against the USSR".

The Peking leaders are pounding away at the idea that they will wage an uncompromising struggle for their "general line" for "ten thousand years" and they are trying to foist this "line" on all the revolutionary forces of our time. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and fraternal parties all over the world, true to their anti-imperialist struggle, have no intention of agreeing to a compromise in matters of principle. They will not deviate a jot from Marxism-Leninism and will fight unceasingly for the cohesion of the socialist community and the entire world communist movement on the only correct basis, that of Marxism-Leninism. No matter how acute the differences may be in the ideological sphere, the Soviet Union has never transferred them to the sphere of its inter-state relations with China.

As soon as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union encountered difficulties in its relations with the Communist Party of China it did not confine itself to general statements but in conformity with the spirit of internationalism advanced specific proposals for restoring and developing economic and cultural ties and coordinating the foreign policies of the USSR and

China. The letter of the CPSU Central Committee of November 29, 1963, and other documents issued by the CPSU and the Soviet government outlined a broad programme for the development of Soviet-Chinese relations.

But already at that time the CPC Central Committee had no intention of responding to the CPSU's initiatives. In its letter of February 29, 1964, disregarding all the constructive proposals of the Soviet side, it produced countless pretexts for exacerbating Soviet-Chinese relations and the most ignominious falsifications. Everything pointed to the fact that the CPC leadership, far from being concerned to normalize the situation, was out to bring the tensions between China and the USSR to a head and was pursuing an openly hostile policy towards the Soviet Union.

Eloquent evidence of this were the "eighth" and "ninth" articles carried by *Renmin ribao* and *Hungqi* in 1963 in the series of what were called the "replies" to the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee of July 14, 1963, which dwelt at length with Soviet-Chinese relations. The articles bristled with absurd assertions about the Soviet social and state systems and abused the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In their fit of anger the falsifiers failed to see that they were censuring not so much the USSR as the fundamental ideas and principles of socialism: social ownership of the means of production, the leading role of the Communist Party and socialist democracy. As time went on Peking continued its escalation of anti-Sovietism and its siding with imperialism on the basis of hegemonism, a stand which soon developed into a partnership.

* * *

In the arsenal of Maoist falsifications a prominent place belongs to the allegation that the USSR had repeatedly sought to bring China under its "military control". It is claimed, for instance, that in 1958 the Soviet Union had proposed to China the creation of a joint Soviet-Chinese navy and had even insisted on placing it under joint command. The Maoists spread such fabrications even through official channels: in October, 1973, the Chinese Foreign Minister made a statement to this effect from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly. Chinese officials regularly referred to this subject in talks.

What are the facts? In 1958 the Chinese government officially applied to the Soviet Union for aid in strengthening its navy. Because of the complex nature of the matter the Soviet side proposed holding consultations to study the possibilities of satisfying China's request and to find a joint solution to the problem. Thus the point in question was to determine what kind of navy China needed, in order to discuss with competent Chinese representatives what technical equipment would be needed and what the Soviet Union could do in this respect, and not the formation of some kind of "joint fleet" under "joint command".

But Mao Zedong and his supporters completely distorted the nature of the Soviet proposal and turned it into an unscrupulous gamble and pretext for aggravating relations with the USSR.

Mao Zedong once admitted that the request for the formation of a Chinese navy had come from the Chinese side. He said that the Chinese

representatives "had made a draft of the project, discussed it and as a result of this sent the request to Moscow". In its reply the Soviet side had stressed that owing to the importance of the matter it would be more expedient to discuss it in Moscow.

After receiving repeated explanations Mao Zedong was forced to admit that "all the dark clouds had been dispersed" and "the question was withdrawn". Thus the question of the "joint navy" was fabricated from beginning to end and is clearly being used by the Chinese leadership for provocative aims.

The question of building a radio station for communication with vessels in the Pacific is depicted by the Maoists in a similar light. In their statements the Maoists cite this episode as an attempt by the USSR to "violate China's sovereignty".

In fact at the Soviet-Chinese consultations held in 1958 the high-ranking Soviet officials made a special point of the fact that there could be no question of USSR ownership of the station which "should be wholly Chinese". The Soviet side proposed that agreement be reached on building the station on equal terms and at once spoke of the possibility of the Chinese side using Soviet radio stations in the Far East for its defence needs. The Chinese representatives not only had no objections to the project but even said the station could be "financed by the Chinese government and used jointly with the USSR". Far from infringing on China's sovereignty in any way the Soviet proposal stemmed from the desire to help the People's Republic of China. As soon as the Chinese representatives

questioned the need for such a station the Soviet side dropped the matter.

These and other facts from the history of Soviet-Chinese relations show that the Maoists were using various aspects of inter-state relations to depict themselves as the "injured side" or rather to create pretexts for unleashing anti-Soviet campaigns. Now, in the 1980s, the essence of their provocative anti-Soviet actions of the 1960s, which were then carefully disguised, has become obvious: they were used to create pretexts for undermining Soviet-Chinese relations.

SOVIET COMMUNISTS STRIVE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS AFTER THE OCTOBER PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE (1964)

In speaking of the Soviet Communist Party's goodwill and search for ways to overcome the Soviet-Chinese differences one should note the great constructive effort applied by the CPSU Central Committee in the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations after the October Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee held in 1964.

For the last 25 years the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have invariably been calling for the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. Their specific actions and the substance of their efforts are extensively discussed in Soviet scientific literature. Here attention will be drawn to the events of 1964. The decisions of the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU

Central Committee stemmed from the fact that the existence of serious ideological differences did not diminish the need to achieve unity of practical action, above all, in the struggle against imperialism, and to develop inter-state ties. With support from other Marxist-Leninist parties the CPSU ended all criticism in the press of the CPC leadership's views and actions. Peking did not reciprocate and continued its anti-Soviet propaganda. Nevertheless, in 1964 the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government invited a Party and state delegation of China to Moscow to take part in the celebrations to mark the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution so that top-level contacts could be used to find ways for normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations.

The Chinese delegation, among whose members were Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng, tried to use direct and blunt pressure to make the Communist Party of the Soviet Union abandon its principled stand, and used every chance, not stopping short of blackmail to accuse the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of an "unfriendly" attitude to the Communist Party of China. They resorted to the slogan of "the bankruptcy of contemporary revisionism" and "the victory of Mao Zedong's thoughts" in order to brainwash the leaders of other fraternal parties and countries who had arrived in Moscow and to sow seeds of discord in the socialist community and the international communist movement.

The Chinese side made a demand that was unprecedented in relations between sovereign parties: the CPSU was told to turn from its policy based on the decisions of the 20th-22nd Con-

gresses, the CPSU Programme and the documents of the Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960, and to adopt a policy founded on "Mao Zedong's thoughts", and the notorious "25 points" of China's "general line" set out in the document of the CPC Central Committee which was carried by *Renmin ribao* on July 14, 1963.¹

These attempts met with failure. In Moscow the Chinese delegation was told that the political course of all the CPSU Congresses reflected the will of the whole Party and all the Soviet people.

As for specific aspects of Soviet-Chinese relations, the position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was defined at this meeting as

¹ It should be noted that Peking prefers to "forget" this thoroughly demagogic and opportunistic document that gave everyone instructions on "ways of carrying out revolution". After the pseudo-imperialist and Pharisaical nature of the Peking leaders has been exposed by most of the participants in the anti-imperialist front the Chinese leadership took the road of open collaboration and collusion with the more aggressive circles of imperialism and reaction.

In their "25 points" the Peking leaders had condemned NATO and other imperialist military blocs. Today they themselves have virtually turned into something like a "part-time" member of all these blocs, a kind of "Eastern NATO" that is being used as an instrument of US imperialist policy.

In 1963 Deng Xiaoping continued to harp on the same tune: that "the aggressive essence of US imperialism would never change", that "imperialists should never be trusted — they are sure to deceive". Today along with other Chinese leaders he has forgotten these words and, denouncing the Soviet Union as "the people's chief enemy", urges the creation of a "broad united front" comprising all countries, including the US, against the world's leading socialist state.

clearly as possible: it stated that in the interests of their common cause the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China should proceed in their relations from factors of their unity, and not disunity, because the essence of the problem was to start normalizing the situation despite existing ideological differences. It was stressed that according to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union it would be expedient to put an end to open polemics and to discuss the question of both Parties taking joint steps for strengthening the anti-imperialist front as well as exchanging views on the practical aspects of Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations.

At the 1964 meeting in Moscow the CPC leaders again confirmed their refusal to refrain from open polemics. They also categorically rejected the proposal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to keep polemics within the framework of comradely discussion.

The Chinese delegation refrained from discussing specific measures to unite the anti-imperialist front and, as it turned out later, had not without reason turned down the proposal to discuss Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations and failed to put forward any positive proposals for their normalization.

The Soviet delegation responded with a new important initiative—to hold a top-level meeting of Chinese and Soviet Communist Party representatives with a view to exchanging opinions on several questions and restoring confidence and unity between the two Parties and countries, as soon as the Chinese leaders were ready for this. It was proposed to hold the meeting

either in Moscow or Peking at any time that was convenient to the Chinese side. The Chinese leaders did not support this proposal.

* * *

In the years that followed the Soviet Union made repeated approaches to China with a number of constructive proposals whose realization could have improved their inter-state relations considerably. Listing even a few of these initiatives will show the unbiassed reader the good intentions of the Soviet Union.

On July 8, 1970, the Soviet Union proposed the issuing of a joint public declaration by the Soviet and Chinese governments to the effect that both sides made no claims to each other's territories and were firmly resolved to preserve the status quo and a normal atmosphere on their borders.

On January 15, 1971, the Chinese government received a draft treaty on the renunciation of the use of force and on June 14, 1973—a draft treaty of non-aggression to be concluded between the USSR and China. Since then, and especially in the last few years, the USSR has repeatedly advanced a number of proposals on developing cooperation and exchange in the spheres of science and technology, public health and sports, and between their mutual friendship societies, on jointly improving the conditions for navigation in the border sections of the rivers in the Amur basin, and on developing frontier trade.

Thus the Soviet Union's stand shows that there are no questions in relations between the

USSR and China that could not be solved with a good-neighbourly approach. The USSR has always expressed its readiness to give close attention to any constructive initiatives from the Chinese side. But these initiatives have never come. Neither has there been a positive reaction to constructive proposals coming from the Soviet Union. Many of them remained unanswered, others were groundlessly rejected.

Moreover, in April, 1979, the Chinese leadership refused to prolong the term of action of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance which the two countries had signed in February, 1950.

In a situation where the Chinese leaders were siding with imperialism the Soviet-Chinese treaty was regarded in Peking as a brake on its plans to knock together "a single broad front" of struggle against the forces of peace, socialism and progress. In response to this hostile action the Soviet government issued a statement to the effect that regardless of how hard the opponents of Soviet-Chinese friendship might try to delete all the good things achieved in the years of friendly cooperation between the two countries and to build a wall of enmity between the two peoples, their attempts would end in failure and that responsibility for breaking off the Treaty lay wholly with the Chinese side.

Nevertheless, due to the Soviet Union's efforts Soviet-Chinese talks were begun in Moscow in the autumn of 1979 with the object of normalizing inter-state relations. The Soviet government delegation submitted a draft of a Declaration on the Principles of Relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China.

Its signing could have provided an effective legal basis for normalizing and developing bilateral relations.

The talks showed once again that the Chinese side was not interested in normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations and had no intention of taking any real steps in this direction, that the Chinese leaders' strategic policy and their anti-Soviet course had not changed.

The Peking leadership is now forced to think up pretexts in order to justify its refusal to improve Soviet-Chinese relations in the eyes of world public opinion. With this aim in view it resorts to tactics which can be aptly defined as the "Chinese vicious circle".

The Chinese leadership claims that before a solution can be reached on any aspect of Soviet-Chinese relations it is necessary to achieve progress in settlement of the "border issue". In this instance by "progress" they mean the Soviet Union's acceptance of a number of ridiculous terms. One of these is Soviet recognition of China's territorial claims to the so-called "disputed areas" embracing tens of thousands of square kilometres of Soviet territory with cities, autonomous districts and regions inhabited for centuries by the population of the Russian state.

When the Chinese leadership agreed to take part in negotiations with the USSR it was pursuing entirely different political aims. It sought:

— to deceive world public opinion by its tactics of manoeuvring in Soviet-Chinese relations: maintaining its anti-Soviet and anti-socialist policy under the guise of an attitude of "goodwill" and a "realistic approach" to relations with the USSR;

— to bring pressure to bear upon the US and NATO countries by threatening to normalize China's relations with the USSR, with the aim of gaining concessions from the imperialist powers with regard to military and economic aid to China, and thereby strengthening the latter as a counterbalance to the USSR;

— to put pressure on the Soviet Union by presenting categorical demands, on the one hand, and pretending to be ready to settle the respective issues, on the other.

Soviet-Chinese talks were held to the accompaniment of Peking's unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda which was launched against virtually all the aspects of the foreign and even domestic policies of the USSR, Vietnam and other socialist countries.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s Peking presented additional demands to the USSR: the one-sided withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Chinese border; the withdrawal of Soviet military units from the Mongolian People's Republic, which were stationed there at the request of the Mongolian government and in accordance with the relevant agreement; the curtailment of Soviet aid and support to heroic Vietnam to protect it from Peking's expansionist aims which also extended to other countries in South-East Asia; the withdrawal of the limited contingents of Soviet military units stationed in Afghanistan at the request of its legitimate government and in order to help repel aggression on the part of Pakistan, the US and China.

Otherwise, as Deng Xiaoping said in an interview to foreign correspondents in November,

1980, Soviet-Chinese relations would not change even in 10-20 years' time.

Such are the unprecedented "terms" put forward by the Chinese leaders simply as a condition for resuming negotiations.

It is indicative that all these demands are being made at a time when China is continuing to concentrate military forces in its frontier areas, to make ever new claims to the territory of the USSR and of Mongolia and to carry on subversive activities against these countries. Such ultimatums are obviously calculated to hinder all possibilities of normalizing relations between the two countries.

Yet the Soviet Union could with much greater justification make preliminary demands of Peking, such as obliging China: to renounce the knocking together of "the broadest international front" against the USSR, which is inscribed in the Chinese constitution; to renounce its "mini" and "maxi" claims to the 33,000 square kilometres and 1.5 million square kilometres of Soviet territory, which are named in official Chinese documents; to guarantee that it will undertake no more attacks on socialist Vietnam, will respect the sovereignty of Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos and Kampuchea and refrain from interfering in their domestic affairs; to end its undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and so on. The Soviet Union does not advance these just demands because it is well aware that such an approach would bring the talks to an impasse.

After Mao Zedong's death the Soviet Union took several steps showing its sincere readiness to improve relations with China.

At the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly that opened in September, 1976, USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who headed the Soviet delegation, stressed in his statement that the Soviet Union had attached and continued to attach great importance to its relations with China. The normalization of their relations, he said, would have a favourable effect on the situation in Asia and in the world. "Our position here in relation to the People's Republic of China was clearly defined by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. It remains in full force today...."

Feelings of friendship and goodwill towards the Chinese people were expressed in a message of greeting from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the formation of the People's Republic of China. The message said that the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and their development on the basis of equality, respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs would conform to the wishes of the Soviet and Chinese peoples who were interested in building socialism and communism and in preserving and consolidating world peace and security.

In his speech at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, held in October, 1976, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, clearly defined the Soviet Union's principled approach to the development of its ties with China. "As for the Soviet Union," he said, "it has consistently pursued a course of trying to improve relations with

China... I would like to underline that, in our opinion, there are no issues in relations between the USSR and the PRC that could not be resolved in a spirit of good-neighbourliness. We will continue working towards this goal. The matter will depend on what stand will be taken by the other side".¹

How did the post-Maoist leadership in Peking react to the Soviet Union's policy of normalizing relations with China? The very first months of its rule showed that it was following the same course and had no intention of changing its anti-Soviet policy. Moreover, the new Chinese leaders in every way stressed their firm adherence to that policy and used every pretext to show their die-hard enmity towards the Soviet Union.

On February 28, 1977, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichev, who headed the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on border issues returned to Moscow from Peking. The responsibility for the failure of the negotiations lay with the Chinese side: Peking rejected all the Soviet proposals without any discussion, all the time claiming that "conditions had not yet ripened" for their realization. In reply to the Soviet proposal to put an end to polemics and create an atmosphere of goodwill the Chinese side categorically declared that "disputes on questions of principle" (meaning nothing less than unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda and interference in the USSR's domestic affairs) would be inevitable and would go on for "ten thousand years", until the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

¹ *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977, pp. 246-247.

publicly admitted "its erroneous policy" and gave guarantees that it would not repeat these "mistakes" in future. These great power claims were naturally given a due rebuff.

One of the motives behind Peking's mounting anti-Soviet hysteria was to make the Soviet Union abandon its principled stand with regard to China and thus gain additional "arguments" for justifying its policy of attacks against the USSR. These attempts failed.

The Soviet view of the development of relations with China was also given by Leonid Brezhnev in his answers to Shoryu Hata, chief editor of the Japanese newspaper *Asahi*, on June 6, 1977. "We want to normalize inter-state relations with China," he said. "The re-establishment of really good-neighbourly relations between our two countries would be of great importance for the USSR and the People's Republic of China and would also improve the international situation as a whole.

"It is through the fault of the other side that there is no sign of any improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations. Unfortunately, the new Chinese leadership is following the old, worn-out road, so to speak. It is common knowledge that a campaign of denunciation of the policy of détente continues and everything is being done to thwart any measures in the field of disarmament."¹

At its third session the tenth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee, held from July 16 to 21, 1977, officially confirmed that the new CPC leadership adhered to its former positions

¹ *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, pp. 89-90.

and in foreign and domestic policy continued to follow the basic Maoist directives.

The plenary meeting predetermined largely the character and substance of the decisions adopted at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China held from August 12 to 18, 1977. The Congress stressed its fidelity to Mao Zedong's foreign policy course, reaffirmed his great power and militarist theses, proclaimed a policy of struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries and made gross attacks on the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese leaders' great power anti-Soviet platform was given a further boost at the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress in March, 1978.

As the highest body of state power in China, it confirmed the Chinese leaders' anti-Soviet course formulated at the 11th CPC Congress, enshrined this course in the basic law of the land—the Constitution of the People's Republic of China—and developed it still further. The struggle against the USSR and its allies has not only become a Party norm affirmed in the Party Rules, but also a constitutional norm, that is to say, one incumbent on every member of the Communist Party of China and on every citizen of the People's Republic of China. An amendment has been made to the Constitution to bring it in line with the documents adopted at the 11th CPC Congress, an amendment which labels the Soviet Union as China's number one enemy.

Speakers at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China made groundless charges

against the Soviet Union, claiming that it "has not given up the idea of enslaving our country" and drawing the conclusion that the Chinese "must be ready to fight" and "build up a powerful land army and a powerful air and naval force as well."¹ At the National People's Congress session the Premier of China's State Council repeated this accusation word for word and linked it with the need to step up the rate of China's entire economic development. Thus anti-Sovietism was bound up with the "general task" of China's domestic policy.

Among the new developments at the session was the proclamation of China's demands from a parliamentary rostrum, thereby giving them an official character.

Here too pride of place was given to Peking's false version of the "mutual agreement of the heads of the Chinese and Soviet governments" reached at the summit meeting on September 11, 1969. The heads of government had agreed not to divulge either the content of their conversation at Peking airport nor their talks on border questions. The Chinese side violated the agreement by making public its own interpretation of the "mutual understanding" at the National People's Congress session and later in *Renmin ribao*. One must therefore explain what actually took place at the meeting of heads of government in September.

First of all, the questions discussed at the meeting fell into two definite categories: questions on which both sides expressed identical or kindred points of view, and those which led to differences of opinion and even opposite stands.

¹ *Renmin ribao*, June 4, 1978.

Among the questions in the first category was the question of restoring relations at the level of ambassadors, increasing trade between the two countries and restoring direct high-frequency telephone communications. The heads of state also reached agreement that the settlement of border disputes was very important for normalizing inter-state relations. They agreed to refrain from armed border conflicts, to start negotiations on a border settlement and to preserve the *status quo* on the border (it was stressed that the main principle in observing the *status quo* was recognition of the existing boundary and that both sides would remain where they were at the time of the summit meeting, that is to say, September 11, 1969). This was the essence of the agreement and the main result of the meeting.

Among questions in the second category, upon which opinions differed in principle, were questions of the "disputed areas", of the disposition of military personnel and the manner of carrying on economic activities in the "disputed areas". The sides failed to agree that they should sign an agreement on the maintenance of the *status quo* on the border as a preliminary condition for discussion of the border question, the agreement to which the Chinese leaders so frequently refer today.

The meeting of heads of government failed to work out any coordinated document setting down in written form the points discussed in their talks. After the meeting letters were exchanged between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Premier of China's State Council in which the sides made clear their position on

all the questions that had been raised at the meeting of September 11, 1969.

In his letter of September 18, 1969, Zhou Enlai formulated China's "provisional measures" for normalizing the situation on the border and avoiding military conflicts. These included demands that the USSR recognize the existence of "disputed areas" on Soviet territory, withdraw Soviet troops from these areas and conclude an agreement on the *status quo*—all the points that were rejected by the Soviet side at the meeting of September 11, 1969. In his letter Zhou Enlai wrote that on these points the heads of government had merely "exchanged opinions" and that confirmation of the aforesaid demands by a letter from the head of the Soviet government could easily turn them into an intergovernmental agreement.

The reply of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers of September 26, 1969, once again showed that the Soviet side could not agree to the provisions proposed by the Chinese Premier.

Peking is well aware of the real state of affairs. Nevertheless the Chinese side jumbled up all the points raised at the meeting, lumping together those points to which the Soviet side had not agreed with those on which opinions had only been exchanged. That is how the Chinese story of a "mutual agreement of heads of government" was hatched.

The March session of the National People's Congress in 1978 not only failed to bring any improvement in China's relations with the Soviet Union but made them even worse.

It is common knowledge that China's attitude has not changed for the better. Enmity towards the Soviet Union permeates all aspects of the Peking leaders' policy and is zealously cultivated in China.

There is a steadily growing urge not only to provide a "theoretical" basis for China's claims to the USSR, which were advanced by Mao Zedong in his notorious "list" in July, 1964, but to make this "list" into the basis of practical politics. The Peking chauvinists lay claim to territory in nearly all the states neighbouring on China. The total area of the territories on which they have set their eye exceeds three million square kilometres, or one-third of China's own territory, or an area 5-6 times the size of France.

In its relations with China the Soviet Union is guided firmly and consistently by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Along with firm opposition to the Chinese leaders' policy and ideology these decisions envisage readiness on the part of the USSR to normalize relations with China along the lines of peaceful coexistence. In accordance with the Congress decisions, on February 24, 1978, the Soviet Union took an important step aimed at normalizing relations with China by dispatching a statement by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

The statement proposed that both countries should make a joint declaration of the principles of their relations, saying that they would be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence and firm adherence to the principles of equality, mutual respect for each other's sover-

eighty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and the renunciation of force.

On March 9, 1978, the Chinese leadership rudely rejected these proposals. In its note the Chinese Foreign Ministry, citing instructions from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress described the proposed joint document on the principles of relations between the two countries "an empty statement" and repeated China's categorical claims to Soviet territory contained in Hua Guofeng's report to the National People's Congress.

The Chinese leaders' anti-Soviet policy was confirmed once again in the decisions of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Plenary Meetings of the CPC Central Committee (1978-1980), the 2nd and 3rd sessions of the National People's Congress of the fifth convocation (1979-1980) and in numerous statements they made.

The campaign now under way in China to normalize social and political and economic life in the country is geared to struggle against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community and to intensive military preparations. The Chinese leaders have declared the struggle against the USSR to be their key task for the 1980s. They have backed US "sanctions" against the Soviet Union, have refused to proceed to the second stage of Soviet-Chinese talks, and are curtailing trade with the USSR; they refused to take part in the Olympic Games in Moscow. A malicious anti-Soviet campaign is in full swing in China. The Chinese press is calling on the West to fight against the USSR before it reaches its military and economic "peak",

warning that otherwise "it will be too late". In an interview to *The New York Times* in the summer of 1980 a deputy chairman of the CPC Central Committee tried to scare Western countries by talk of the "Soviet threat" and called on them to check the Soviet Union if they did not want a new world war. He attacked those in the West who insisted on détente and said that China was against any concessions to, compromises or conciliation with the USSR.¹

The Peking leaders keep on reiterating their outworn thesis of an alleged Soviet "military threat" to China and ascribe to the USSR the absurd aims of "unleashing a world war", "enslaving" China, and so on, thereby deliberately distorting the principled stand of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Chinese question.²

This position of the Chinese authorities shows that they do not intend to improve relations with their neighbour. It is obvious that there are forces in China which find the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations and the deliberate fanning of anti-Sovietism more to their liking. They regard this as a service they render to the forces

¹ The notorious Deng Xiaoping made even more provocative anti-Soviet attacks, especially in the interview he gave to Italian journalist Orand Fallaci, which was widely reported in the Chinese press in November, 1980.

² Speaking at a meeting in Moscow to celebrate the 63rd anniversary of the October Revolution Nikolai Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said: "By its policy and its activities the USSR proved long ago that it does not threaten anyone, nor does it intend to do so. This is equally true in regard to China, with which we are also prepared to maintain and develop normal relations."

of imperialism and reaction in return for their policy of partnership and rapprochement with China and their promises to provide credits and "aid" for carrying out the "four modernizations" programme.

True Chinese revolutionaries, however, remember from what source China received genuine aid and assistance for its national liberation movement at all the stages of the revolution and the outcome of Kuomintang China's policy of achieving the "national prosperity" through the agency of the comprador bourgeoisie, US and Japanese imperialism and other enemies of the Chinese people.

Despite Peking's stubborn anti-Soviet policy the Soviet Union's measures to normalize relations with China are highly significant. They hamstring the provocative plans of the leaders of the Communist Party of China and expose the anti-socialist essence of their policy. Regardless of how Peking reacts to them, the Soviet initiatives are welcomed by all who are interested in normalizing Soviet-Chinese cooperation. They have another significance as well, for they give the Chinese people convincing proof that the Soviet side is exerting every effort to restore good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

As for the Soviet Union, despite the Peking leaders' raving anti-Sovietism and bourgeois forecasts of an "inevitable split" between the USSR and China, the Soviet people, guided by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian and socialist internationalism, have always firmly believed and still believe today that Soviet-Chinese friendship will inevitably triumph.

The line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people on the Chinese question is clearly set out in the decisions of the 25th and 26th Party Congresses.

* * *

The question is often asked: what are the main reasons for the turnabout in China's political course? Is it because its leaders place China's national interests above international interests and are seeking special advantages for their own people? Though unworthy of a true internationalist and unjustifiable, such a policy could be understood. The answer, however, is much more complicated. The point is that the Maoists' policy affects above all the Chinese people's national interests, it deprives them of support from their true friends, and creates additional economic hardships which aggravate the position of the Chinese working people, hard as it is.

Moreover, having taken the road of struggle against the USSR and the majority of other socialist countries the Maoists are ready to sacrifice the cause of building socialism in China for the sake of achieving their own ambitions. Socialism cannot be achieved without the development of up-to-date productive forces. By breaking off with the socialist community the Maoist leaders have deprived their country of a reliable and disinterested source of aid. It is not by chance that their official announcements of making a rapid transition "straight" to communism have given place to a new thesis that the building of socialism requires the effort of scores of generations. The assumption that the shift in

the CPC leaders' policy stemmed from national interests holds no water.

What makes the Chinese leaders pay such a dear price for their ambitions? Why are they sacrificing their country's national interests? According to the Maoists, their break with the USSR was the result of their "loyalty" to the revolutionary cause, their resolve to wage an "uncompromising struggle" against imperialism, and so on, a claim that is wholly refuted by facts.

By pursuing a hostile international policy towards the socialist community and presenting a broad antagonistic front to it the leaders of the Communist Party of China have grossly trampled upon the Marxist-Leninist principles of a socialist state's foreign policy, thereby turning into renegades and junior partners of imperialism. Speaking of the roots of the Chinese Communist Party's mounting differences with the world communist movement, one may cite Peking's stand on the Indian-Chinese border dispute which occurred in the period from 1959 to 1962. The Maoists were not disturbed by the fact that the unleashing of a military conflict with India ran counter to the socialist countries' policy of peaceful coexistence, which India had always adhered to and supported. Moreover, the Maoists took pride in their actions and openly sympathized with a policy of brinkmanship. This was only the beginning of Maoist China's aggressive actions.

When one speaks of a shift in policy one must specify what is exchanged for what. While stepping up their attacks against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries the Maoists

were expanding all-round economic and political ties with the imperialist powers, though it was more than obvious that the latter's willingness to establish contacts with China was in the nature of a reward for China's hostility towards the socialist community. Moreover, Peking regarded these contacts as compensation for the advantages of cooperation with the socialist camp which it had rejected of its own accord and on its own initiative.

China's pro-imperialist course now amounts to joint and parallel actions undertaken with the imperialist states in the struggle against socialism and the national liberation movement.

The Peking leaders are goading the ruling circles of the US, Japan and Western Europe to set up a global anti-Soviet and anti-communist alliance. In their political game the imperialist states and above all the US attach increasing importance to playing the "China card". As noted at the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in July, 1980, the partnership between imperialism and Peking hegemonism is a new and dangerous phenomenon in world politics which both sides regard as a long-term strategy. China's expanding military cooperation with the imperialist powers and the increasing endeavours of its leaders to obtain broad access to their military arsenals is a particular threat to world peace. Indicative in this respect are the visits to China of the US Secretary of Defence and Britain's Secretary of State for Defence and the contacts between representatives of the Chinese army and the Japanese and West German top brass. Military cooperation between China and the US is making particular headway.

The two countries have reached an agreement on coordinating their actions in the military sphere, exchanging intelligence data and students of military educational establishments, as well as providing China with the latest military equipment.

A tripartite alliance is in the making between the US, Japan and China, based on their hostility to the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and progressive regimes in the developing countries and on their opposition to peace and détente. The intensification of military cooperation within the framework of the "triangle" is a new factor destabilizing the situation in Asia and throughout the world and increasing the threat of a new war. The capitalist countries have signed an agreement on granting credits to China of more than 30,000 million dollars, which Peking intends to use first and foremost for strengthening its military-industrial potential. Peking's belligerent course, based on the "four modernizations" programme and bolstered by investments and arms deliveries from the West, is growing ever more dangerous. China's increasing military potential and its growing threat to other countries and peoples are confirmed by such facts as its possession of large supplies of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and its testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles in May, 1980.

On November 6, 1980, Nikolai Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, said: "The rapprochement between imperialism and Peking hegemonism is causing growing anxiety among nations. Goad-

ing each other into dangerous ventures in Asia and elsewhere in the world, they are both trying to cover up their aggressive schemes and activities with lies about a 'Soviet military threat'. And the lesser the chances are of confusing public opinion, the louder are the voices of the anti-Sovieteers."

Today even a layman in politics is well aware of what stands behind such developments: if Peking has decided to make the socialist countries its chief enemy instead of imperialism, it will seek aid and support in this venture from the imperialists, because naturally it cannot be at war with everyone at the same time. Hence its choice.

It is obvious that the turnabout in the Chinese leaders' policy is hardly the result of their blatant "revolutionariness" or concern for China's national interests. Their chief aim is to achieve hegemonism in the national liberation movement, which Peking regards as a possible source of support in its political activities, and then achieve hegemonism in the whole world. The Chinese leaders lay claim to the role of supreme leaders of the "broad front" of struggle against the Soviet Union which they are out to knock together from among "great", "middle" and "minor" states, regardless of their class systems.

According to Peking, the way to achieve these aims is to use the developing countries in the interests of China's great power ambitions. Naturally, the Chinese leaders cannot disregard the huge prestige and influence of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community in the national liberation movement. That is why in order to gear the developing countries' policy to their

anti-Soviet course the Chinese leaders are trying "to kill two birds with one stone". The Soviet Union is labelled a "social-imperialist" country and consequently excluded from the national-liberation movement.

Although Peking has fabricated hundreds of articles branding the USSR as a "revisionist clique" and even an "imperialist" power, it cannot keep secret the essence of its policy, which has been deliberately reoriented to struggle against the Soviet Union and most of the other socialist countries, is aimed at undermining the unity of the revolutionary forces and consequently plays into the hands of the more aggressive imperialist circles. Peking is becoming a partner of imperialism.

It is indicative that Mao Zedong began his open attacks against the general line of the communist movement and the socialist states' coordinated foreign policy under the guise of a "left" stand and struggle against "contemporary revisionism". At first the Chinese leaders counted on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties, which adhered firmly to the standpoint of proletarian internationalism, being ousted from Marxism-Leninism. Now Peking declares the USSR to be "enemy number one".

The zigzags in the Chinese leaders' policy mirror the very essence of this belligerent petty-bourgeois trend, which is turning utter unscrupulousness in means and methods into "a matter of principle". The fits and starts in their policy show that the Peking leaders are ready to resort to all, even mutually incompatible, means to realize their chauvinistic, great power, hege-

monistic ambitions on the world scene and establish their undivided rule in China.

An analysis of Peking's present domestic and foreign policies and its ideological doctrine brings one to the conclusion that the Chinese leaders' anti-socialist and hegemonistic course has entered a new stage. The Fifth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in February, 1980, and the Third Session of the National People's Congress in September, 1980, mark an important step towards defining the ideological, theoretical and organizational structure of this stage.

What are its main features?

First, the Chinese leaders' openly pro-imperialist course, which was mapped out long ago, at the time of Peking's struggle against the two superpowers, and accompanied by ultra-revolutionary slogans and fulminations against imperialism, has now culminated in a partnership with the imperialist states leading to joint and parallel actions in the world arena. China regards this policy as a long-term strategic line which envisages broad military-political cooperation with the US and Japan on an anti-Soviet basis.

Second, the strengthening of the regime in China, the further development of its mechanism of power and the accelerated development of its economic and war potential, including contemporary types of weapons, with the help of imperialism, offer Peking's hegemonistic course additional material support and fresh possibilities. It can be promoted by China's economic reforms, though in the final resort they draw China even further away from the socialist camp.

Third, the present Chinese leadership is out

to extend the framework of the "broad front" against the USSR and the socialist community by drawing into its activities some of the "Left" forces and different nationalistic and opportunist elements in the world revolutionary movement.

Fourth, Maoist theory and practice are undergoing modernization. While retaining its great power anti-socialist essence, Maoist doctrine is becoming more flexible and attractive both to imperialism and "Right"-wing opportunism. The "Right"-wing pragmatic modification of Maoism creates an ideological basis for Peking's lining up with imperialism and opportunism of every hue.

It has always been and it remains the highest revolutionary duty of true Marxist-Leninists, and one that serves the vital interests of the world communist movement, to expose to the world public the ideological perversity of Maoist theory and practice, its total incompatibility with Marxism-Leninism. In exposing Maoism in its many varieties Soviet Communists are struggling for a socialist China, for its Marxist-Leninist Party, for the genuine interests of the Chinese people who have come to grief.

By its unceasing struggle against Maoism's reactionary ideology and policy the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is promoting the development of wholesome tendencies in China's social and political course.

Why do we believe in China's socialist future?

First, because elements of the socialist basis which was laid in China in the early revolutionary years have been objectively preserved.

Second, because the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union, as Leonid Brezhnev has repeatedly pointed out, does not identify China's hegemonistic policy with the Chinese people. The Chinese people are the victims of this policy and are bound to realize the fact sooner or later and make their choice.

Third, because by exposing Maoism and counteracting the great power policy of the Peking leaders the CPSU is struggling for China's socialist future, to prevent it from passing over completely into the imperialist camp.

In the last resort the cause of socialism will triumph in China. Sooner or later China will take the road of equal cooperation with the socialist community. This will accord with the vital interests of the Chinese people and the interests of world peace.

The international communist movement is continuing to fight confidently against imperialism and the reactionary and belligerent forces. Both "Right"-wing and "Leftist" political forces have failed to make the Communists abandon the correct road they have chosen for themselves. They are guided by a reliable compass—the great teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the general line of the world communist movement and a clearly-defined anti-imperialist platform.

* * *

Looking back at the history of Soviet-Chinese relations there can be no doubt that Mao Zedong and his accomplices were wilfully and consistently striving to worsen these relations and then to make a break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR. At first the Maoists confined themselves to hypocritical state-

ments such as the claim that between the Chinese and the Soviet Communist Parties "nine fingers" were raised in favour of unity and only "a single finger" symbolized their divergence. In the mid-1960s, when relations between the two Parties were still being maintained, the Maoists leadership was already trumpeting that "there was nothing that united the Soviet and the Chinese Communist Parties, but only what disunited them". This policy was at once transferred to the sphere of interstate relations.

It is obvious now that the Peking leaders' ultimate goal was to set the Soviet Union outside the framework of the socialist system and to oust the CPSU from the world communist movement. Having met with total failure, by a stroke of his pen Mao Zedong put the Soviet Union into his category of "social-imperialist" powers. The Maoists needed more and more pretexts for doing this. They were quite adept in devising them, first in the ideological sphere and then in the sphere of inter-state relations.

Official Chinese representatives and propaganda organs attribute to the Soviet Union attempts to "put China under its control", "interfere in China's domestic affairs", and so on. All these fabrications were employed to shift the blame for the situation onto the Soviet Union, to "prove" its "social-imperialist essence" and thereby undermine its international prestige and whip up anti-Soviet hysteria among the Chinese people.

The Maoists were systematically working to achieve another aim—to free themselves from the internationalist obligations which each contingent of the international communist movement

has in relation to the world revolutionary process, and to prepare the way for collusion with the imperialist forces. Such is the pattern of the class treachery perpetrated by Mao Zedong and his group.

Looking back at the history of the differences with the Maoist leadership, the Soviet people may say with a clear conscience that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has spared no effort to stave off the dangerous shift in the development of events, to stay clear of Maoist provocations and to preserve friendly ties with the Communist Party of China and Chinese Communists. It is not our fault that not all of this has been achieved. Moreover, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union along with other Marxist-Leninist parties has from the very beginning stressed the dangerous nature of the Maoist revision of Marxism-Leninism and has warned of the grave danger to socialism inherent in Maoist policy. The theoretical insolvency of the Maoist leaders' political platform was repeatedly emphasized in open and closed letters of the CPSU Central Committee, statements by Party leaders and in the Party press. Life has confirmed the correctness of this criticism.

Anti-Sovietism is not only a question of Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations. Anti-Sovietism is concentrated Chinese social-chauvinism and at the same time the reverse side of the Maoists' anti-socialism. The Maoists focus their attacks on the Soviet Union because they regard it as the chief brake on their expansionist and chauvinistic aims. These aims are thwarted by the example of the Soviet Union, by its experience in building socialism, its achievements in

building communism, its great international prestige and steadily growing economic and defence potential, all of which the Maoists are forced to reckon with.

In 1979 and 1980 the Maoist leaders continued to aggravate Soviet-Chinese relations, thereby demonstrating their complete unwillingness to normalize ties between the two countries. On January 16, 1980, Deng Xiaoping said that struggle against the Soviet Union on a world scale "is China's major foreign political task".

In the growing confrontation between the socialist and capitalist worlds, where Maoist China is playing the role of imperialist stooge in the struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and against détente, this role is becoming a negative factor in international politics.

From the start the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist parties approached the question of the differences between the CPC and the world communist movement from a standpoint of goodwill towards the Chinese people and the cause of socialism in China. They were aware of the complex nature of restructuring social relations along socialist lines in such a large country as China and of the need to find ways and means of achieving this which would combine the general laws of building socialism with China's specific conditions. The CPSU and other fraternal parties did not impose ready-made formulas on the Chinese Communists, nor did they call upon them to copy their methods of building socialism. Instead they wished to share their wide-ranging experience over many years with Chinese Communists to help

them avoid the hardships encountered by the pioneers of this cause and achieve the goals set by the great Chinese revolution, the first five-year plans and the 8th CPC Congress. At the same time they drew attention to the basic dividing line between factors promoting the building of socialism and factors running counter to its underlying principles. The Chinese people could have avoided many tragedies, economic setbacks and the protracted social and cultural crisis if due heed had been given to the reasonable advice that was offered.

Communists and all the people of the Soviet Union have always had a deep respect for the Chinese people who have passed through many ordeals. They sincerely wish them to avoid tragedies such as the "cultural revolution". They firmly believe that only Marxism, and not Maoism, can point the way to China's bright future. Guided by the decisions of the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses, the Soviet Union invariably seeks to restore good-neighbourly relations with the People's Republic of China.

The aggravation of Soviet-Chinese relations is an anomaly. All the necessary prerequisites exist for friendship and cooperation between the USSR and China, for cooperation that would again be highly beneficial to both sides and to world revolutionary development.

By their entire history the Chinese people have proved that they deserve to be called a great and heroic nation. There is no doubt they will be able to overcome their difficulties, defend their revolutionary gains and put China back again on the road of genuine socialist development.